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Labor and Employment Law
by W. Melvin Haas III*
William M. Clifton III"
W. Jonathan Martin II**
and Alyssa Peters Morris"
I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article surveys recent developments in the state statutory and
common law that affect labor and employment relations of Georgia
employers. Accordingly, it surveys published decisions interpreting
Georgia law from June 1, 2010 to May 31, 2011.1 This Article also
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1. For analysis of Georgia labor and employment law during the prior survey period,
see W. Melvin Haas III et al., Laborand Employment Law, Annual Survey of Georgia Law,
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includes highlights of certain revisions to the Official Code of Georgia
Annotated (O.C.G.A.). 2
II.

RECENT LEGISLATION

Modification of Restrictive Covenants
On May 11, 2011, Georgia Governor Nathan Deal signed into law
Georgia House Bill 30," which became effective on that date.' The
express purpose of House Bill 30, together with the previous amendment
to the Georgia Constitution,5 is to clarify the law on restrictive covenants.6 House Bill 173,' a 2009 legislative action, significantly changed
Georgia law on covenants not to compete.' House Bill 173 authorizes

A.

62 MERCER L. REV. 181 (2010).

2. Attorneys practicing labor and employment law have a multitude of reference
sources for recent developments in federal legislation and case law. See generally THE
DEVELOPING LABOR LAW (John E. Higgins, Jr. et al. eds., 5th ed. 2006 & Supp. 2009);
BARBARA T. LINDEMAN & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW (C. Geoffrey
Weirich et al. eds., 4th ed. 2007 & Supp. 2009); W. Christopher Arbrey et al., Labor and
Employment, Eleventh Circuit Survey, 60 MERCER L. REV. 1281 (2009); Bureau of Nat'l
Affairs, Daily Labor Report, BNA.coM, http://www.bna.com/products.labor/dlr.htm (last
visited Aug. 13, 2011). Accordingly, this Article is not intended to cover the latest

developments in federal labor and employment law. Rather, this Article only covers
legislative and judicial developments arising under Georgia state law during the survey
period.
3. Ga. H.R. Bill 30, Reg. Sess. (codified at O.C.G.A. §§ 13-8-2, 13-8-50 to -59 (Supp.
2011)).
4. Id.
5. Ga. H.R. Res. 178 § 1, Reg. Sess., 2010 Ga. Laws 1260, 1260-61 (amending GA.
CONST. art. III, § 6, para. 5(c)(3)).
6. Ga. H.R. Bill 30 § 1 ("During the 2010 legislative session the General Assembly
enacted HR 178 (Ga. L. 2010, p. 1260), the constitutional amendment necessary for the
[Tjhere may be some question about the validity of that
statutory language ....

legislation."); see also Carl Cannon, W. Wright Mitchell & Alyssa Peters Morris, Client
Bulletin #427: Georgians Vote to Make Restrictive Covenants Easier to Enforce, CON-

STANGY.COM (Nov. 5, 2010), http://www.constangy.com/communications-305.html.
discussion in further detail infra Part VII(A).
7. Ga. H.R. Bill 173, Reg. Sess., 2009 Ga. Laws 231 (codified at O.C.G.A.

§§

See

13-8-2, 13-

8-50 to -59 (2010)).
8. Id. § 3, 2009 Ga. Laws at 243 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 13-8-54(b) (2010)). The bill
stated,
[I1f a court finds that a contractually specified restraint does not comply with
[certain provisions of the O.C.G.A.], then the court may modify the restraint
provision and grant only the relief reasonably necessary to protect [a legitimate
business interest established by the person seeking enforcement] and to achieve
the original intent of the contracting parties ....
Id.
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courts to "blue-pencil" otherwise unenforceable covenants rather than
invalidate them entirely.9 House Bill 30 was enacted to remove any
ambiguity following House Bill 173.0

House Bill 30, like House Bill 173, permits a court to modify a
covenant so long as the modification is not more restrictive than the
In determining relief, a court must consider what is
original."
reasonable and the parties' original intent.12 This legislation allows
enforcement of a restrictive covenant by third party beneficiaries or
assignees.xa
Employment Eligibility Verification
On May 13, 2011, Governor Deal signed House Bill 87, also known as
The Illegal Immigration Reform and Enforcement Act of 2011 (Act).14
The Act became effective on July 1, 2011, and amends Chapter 60 of
Title 36 of the O.C.G.A.' The Act requires most private employers to
use the federal work authorization program," also known as "Everify."" Prior to the Act, only those employers who conducted work
B.

9. Id. Previously in Georgia, all covenants within an agreement were unenforceable
where any one covenant was unenforceable. See Ward v. Process Control Corp., 247 Ga.
583, 584, 277 S.E.2d 671, 673 (1981) ("If any covenant not to compete within a given
employment contract is unreasonable either in time, territory, or prohibited business
activity, then all covenants not to compete within the same employment contract are
unenforceable.").
10. Ga. H.R. Bill 30 § 1 ("It is the intention of this Act to remove any such uncertainty
by substantially reenacting the substantive provisions of HB 173 (Act No. 64, Ga. L. 2009,
p. 231), but the enactment of this Act should not be taken as evidence of a legislative
determination that HB 173 (Act No. 64, Ga. L. 2009, p. 231) was in fact invalid.").
11. Id. § 4 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 13-8-54) ("[ihe court may modify the restraint
provision and grant only the relief reasonably necessary to protect such interest or
interests and to achieve the original intent of the contracting parties to the extent
possible.").
12. Id. § 4.
13. Id. (codified at O.C.G.A. § 13-8-58) ("A court shall not refuse to enforce a restrictive
covenant on the ground that the person seeking enforcement is a third-party beneficiary
of such contract or is an assignee or successor to a party to such contract.").
14. Ga. H.R. Bill 87, Reg. Sess. (codified in relevant part at O.C.G.A. §§ 13-10-90, 3660-6 (Supp. 2011)).
15. Id. pmbl., § 22.
16. The Act applies to private employers with more than ten employees, requiring them
to use E-verify for all newly hired employees. Id. § 12 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 36-60-6).
17. Id. § 2 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 13-10-90).
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on federal projects were required to use E-verify." Private employers
will be phased into compliance over a period of a year and a half."
III.

PENDING LEGISLATION

Although not enacted in the 2011 Georgia legislative session, the
following public laws represent potential trends for employer-employee
legislation in coming years.

A.

Parent ProtectionAct

Georgia House Bill 311,20 still in committee, proposes an amendment
to Chapter 1 of Title 34 of the O.C.G.A." if enacted.22 This legislation
will provide a twenty-four hour paid or unpaid leave for employees to
attend school conferences and medical appointments of a spouse or
child.23 The employee must give reasonable notice to the employer.2 4
An employer with three or fewer employees may limit such leave.2 5
Also, eligible employees should take leave under the federal Family
Medical Leave Act of 1993, if possible.2 7

18. Exec. Order No. 13465, 3 C.F.R. 192 (2008), amending Exec. Order No. 12989, 3
C.F.R. 163 (1996). Since 2008, federal contractors and subcontractors have been required
to use E-Verify. See generally UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES,
http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem (last visited Aug. 4, 2011).
19. Ga. H.R. Bill 87 § 12 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 36-60-6). Employers will be phased in
according to their size: 1) By January 1, 2012, employers with 500 or more employees must
comply; 2) By July 1, 2012, employers with more than 100 but fewer than 500 employees;
3) By July 1, 2013, employers with more than 10 but fewer than 100 will be required to
comply. Id.
20. Ga. H.R. Bill 311, Reg. Sess. (2011) (unenacted).
21. O.C.G.A. tit. 34, ch. 1 (2008 & Supp. 2010).
22. Ga. H.R. Bill 311 § 2.
23. Id. § 2(b).
24. Id. § 2(d)(1) ("An eligible employee requesting leave under subsection (b) of this
Code section shall provide reasonable notice to the employer prior to the absence and make
reasonable effort to plan the absence so as not to unduly disrupt the operations of the
employer.").
25. Id. § 2(d)(3) ("An employer with three or fewer employees at the same location may
reasonably limit the number of employees allowed to take a planned absence on the same
calendar day.").
26. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2006 & Supp. 2008).
27. Ga. H.R. Bill 311 § 2(g).
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B.

Sick Leave for Immediate Family Care
Georgia House Bill 43228 also proposes changes to Chapter 1 of Title
34.29 This legislation would require an employer to allow sick leave for
employees to care for immediate family members." If a sick leave
policy exists, the employee must comply.a'
C.

Collective Bargainingby Public Employees
Georgia House Bill 416, still in committee, would amend Chapter
6 of Title 343 if enacted." This legislation would prohibit contracts
between public employers or employees and labor organizations.3 1 Any
contract with a labor organization would be void.
IV.

WRONGFUL TERMINATION

A.

Employment-at-Will
At-will employment refers to employment that either an employer or
an employee may terminate at any time with or without cause."
Employment at-will in other jurisdictions may be weakening," but in
Georgia, the presumption remains that all employment is at-will unless
a statutory or contractual exception exists." "[Tihis bar to wrongful
discharge claims in the at-will employment context 'is a fundamental
statutory rule governing employer-employee relations in Georgia."' 40

28.

Ga. H.R. Bill 432, Reg. Sess. (2011) (unenacted).

29. Id. § 1.
30. Id. § 1(b).
31. Id. § 1(c) ("Any employee who uses such sick leave shall comply with the terms of
the employer's employee sick leave policy.").
32. Ga. H.R. Bill 416, Reg. Sess. (2011) (unenacted).
33. O.C.G.A. tit. 34, ch. 6 (2008).
34. Ga. H.R. Bill 416 § 1.
35. Id. § 2(b).
36. Id. ("Any contract or agreement between a public employee and a labor organization
or between a public employer and a labor organization shall be void."); see O.C.G.A. §§ 346-20 to -28 (2008) (regarding labor unions and employment contracts in Georgia).
37. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 604 (9th ed. 2009).
38. Haas, supra note 1, at 186 & n.37 ("[Tihe employment-at-will doctrine is weakening
in many jurisdictions.").
39. See, e.g., Wilson v. City of Sardis, 264 Ga. App. 178, 179, 590 S.E.2d 383, 385 (2003)
("In the absence of a contractual or statutory 'for cause' requirement ... the employee
serves 'at will' and may be discharged at any time for any reason or no reason. . . .").
40. Reid v. City of Albany, 276 Ga. App. 171, 172, 622 S.E.2d 875, 877 (2005) (quoting
Reilly v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 272 Ga. 279, 280, 528 S.E.2d 238, 240 (2000)).
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Particularly, O.C.G.A. § 34-7-141 provides that "(an indefinite hiring"
is at-will employment.4 ' The definition of an indefinite hiring includes
contract provisions specifying "permanent employment, employment for
life, [and] employment until retirement."4"
Further, a contract
specifying an annual salary does not create a definite period of
employment." However, if an employment contract does specify a
definite period of employment, any employment beyond that period
becomes employment-at-will subject to discharge without cause.
Regardless of an employer's motives, the general rule in Georgia
allows the discharge of an at-will employee "without acquiring a cause
of action for wrongful termination."" Oral promises between an
employer and employee will not modify the relationship between the two;
absent a written contract, an employee's status remains at-will.
B.

Elements of Employer-Employee Contracts
During the survey period, the Georgia Court of Appeals addressed the
strict interpretation of employment-at-will in Georgia. In Tackett v.
Georgia Department of Corrections," the court addressed the requirements to demonstrate a valid employment contract and overcome the
default employment-at-will doctrine.4 9 In Tackett, following an internal
group grievance regarding the compensation paid to investigators, the
Georgia Department of Corrections (DOC) instituted a "new salary
schedule to be applied equally to all investigators." 0 Tackett was one
of two investigators who had their annual salary reduced. Tackett
claimed that the DOC violated his employment contract and he brought
suit to obtain relief. To establish that an employment contract existed,
Tackett introduced three documents to be read in concert with one
another: a letter from Tackett stating he would take a demotion in title
41. O.C.G.A. § 34-7-1 (2008).
42. Id.
43. Ga. Power Co. v. Busbin, 242 Ga. 612, 613, 250 S.E.2d 442, 443-44 (1978) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
44. Ikemiya v. Shibamoto Am., Inc., 213 Ga. App. 271, 273, 444 S.E.2d 351, 353 (1994)
(quoting Gatins v. NCR Corp., 180 Ga. App. 595, 597, 349 S.E.2d 818, 820 (1986)).
45. Schuck v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc., 244 Ga. App. 147, 148, 534 S.E.2d 533,
534 (2000).
46. H&R Block E. Enters., Inc. v. Morris, 606 F.3d 1285, 1294 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting
Nida v. Echols, 31 F. Supp. 2d 1358, 1376 (N.D. Ga. 1998)); see also Fink v. Dodd, 286 Ga.
App. 363, 365, 649 S.E.2d 359, 362 (2007) (alteration in original) ("The employer[ with or
without cause and regardless of its motives may discharge the employee without liability.").
47. Balmer v. Elan Corp., 278 Ga. 227, 228-29, 599 S.E.2d 158, 161 (2004).
48. 304 Ga. App. 310, 696 S.E.2d 359 (2010).
49. Id. at 312-13, 696 S.E.2d at 361-62.
50. Id. at 311, 696 S.E.2d at 361.
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as long as he was paid the same salary as his previous job, an internal
DOC memorandum stating that Tackett's experience and qualifications
justified the higher salary, and portions of the DOC employee manual
stating that salaries may be reduced for disciplinary, budgetary, or
voluntary reasons.
The court of appeals, however, did not share Tackett's reading of the
documents. First, the court held that Tackett's letter and the subsequent memorandum justifying his salary did not constitute a contract
because the documents did not guarantee a salary over the course of
Second, the court held that an employee
Tackett's employment."
manual does not necessarily constitute an employment contract.5 3
Because none of these documents amounted to an employment contract
between the parties, Tackett lacked an actionable claim against the

DOC.5 4
C.

Exceptions to the At-Will Doctrine

The statute creating the at-will doctrine accounts for specific
exemptions.5 5
When employment is not at-will, a termination of
employment suit typically requires a breach of contract"
However,
during the survey period, the Georgia Supreme Court, in City of
McDonough v. Campbell,5 examined whether an employment contract
binds a successor municipal council in violation of Georgia law." In
August of 2005, McDonough's city council passed a resolution authorizing employment contracts with several city employees. These contracts
would renew automatically, contained generous severance packages, and
required that any vote authorizing termination of employment be made
prior to October 30th of that calendar year. Less than a year later, a
new city council declared the previous employment contracts null and
void. Campbell, the city's chief building inspector, brought suit for
breach of contract to recover severance pay.59

51. Id. at 310-12, 696 S.E.2d at 361.
52. Id. at 313, 696 S.E.2d at 362.
53. Id. at 312, 696 S.E.2d at 362 (quoting Doss v. Savannah, 290 Ga. App. 670, 677, 660
S.E.2d 457, 463 (2008)).
54. Id. (quoting Brown v. Rader, 299 Ga. App. 606, 611, 683 S.E.2d 16, 21 (2006))
(explaining that the doctrine of promissory estoppel did not apply to Tackett's claim
because there can be no application "to a promise that is vague, indefinite, or of an
uncertain duration").
55. See O.C.G.A § 34-7-1.
56. See JAMES W. WIMBERLY, JR., GEORGIA EMPLOYMENT LAw 45 (4th ed. 2008).
57. 289 Ga. 216, 710 S.E.2d 537 (2011).
58. Id. at 216, 710 S.E.2d at 538.
59. Id. at 217, 710 S.E.2d at 538.
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In examining the validity of the employment contracts, the supreme
court applied O.C.G.A § 36-30-3(a)60 to the facts."
That statute
provides that "[olne council may not, by an ordinance, bind itself or its
successors so as to prevent free legislation in matters of municipal
government.6 2 The court acknowledged that while municipalities may
enter into valid employment contracts, the contract must "continue for
a reasonable time beyond the official term of the officers entering into
the contract."
However, the court held that the onerous financial
obligations had "the effect of binding the hands of successor councils."'6
The court held that because of the automatic renewal and the unreasonable financial terms, the contract itself was ultra vires and void."

D.

Breach of Contract (Other than At-Will Contracts)

The basic rules of contract law apply in creating a valid employment
contract: competency to contract, offer, acceptance, and valid consideration." Further, for an employment contract to be valid, the terms
must define the nature and character of the services to be performed, the
place of employment, the time period for which the employee is to work,
and the compensation to be owed to the employee." In addition, an
employment contract's enforceability requires sufficient definitiveness in
the terms of the contract.
During the survey period, the court of appeals affirmed that basic
contract rules, including parol evidence, apply to the formation of an

employment contract. In McKinley v. Coliseum Health Group, LLC,69
the court examined whether additional evidence could be used to explain
portions of the agreement.o The employee, McKinley, and the employer, Coliseum Health Group, LLC (Coliseum), entered into an employment
contract, which addressed the calculation of McKinley's salary and
allowable monthly draw. When the contract ended, Coliseum claimed
that McKinley had received excess compensation and sent demand
letters to recover the full amount. McKinley failed to comply and

60. O.C.G.A § 36-30-3(a) (2006).
61. Campbell, 289 Ga. at 217, 710 S.E.2d at 538.
62. O.C.G.A § 36-30-3(a).
63. Campbell, 289 Ga. at 219, 710 S.E.2d at 539 (quoting Jonesboro Area Athletic Ass'n
v. Dickson, 227 Ga. 513, 518, 181 S.E.2d 852, 856 (1971)).
64. Id. at 218, 710 S.E.2d at 539.
65. Id. at 219, 710 S.E.2d at 540.
66. See WIMBERLY, supra note 56, at 6.
67. Id.; see supra Part IV(A).
68. See WIMBERLY, supra note 56, at 6.
69. 308 Ga. App. 768, 708 S.E.2d 682 (2011).
70. Id. at 770-71, 708 S.E.2d at 684-85.
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counterclaimed for compensation based on the assessment of unauthorized fees.n
The court held that the contract was partially integrated and allowed
parol evidence to explain ambiguities.7 2 Under Georgia law, contract
construction involves three steps:
First the trial court must decide whether the contract language is clear
and unambiguous. If it is, the trial court simply enforces the contract
according to its clear terms; the contract alone is looked to for meaning.
Next, if the contract is ambiguous in some respect, the court must
apply the rules of contract construction to resolve the ambiguity.
Finally, if the ambiguity remains after applying the rules of construction, the issue of what the ambiguous language means and what the
parties intended must be resolved by a jury."
A contract is partially integrated where there is ambiguity, so a court
can use parol evidence to resolve the confusion." In this case, the
contract language was extremely broad, and the court used the conduct
of the employer to conclude that the contract intended fees to be
charged." As a result, the parol evidence resolved the ambiguity, and
the court affirmed summary judgment."
V.

NEGLIGENT HIRING OR RETENTION

Under O.C.G.A § 34-7-20,77 "[tihe employer is bound to exercise
ordinary care in the selection of employees and not to retain them after
knowledge of incompetency."" The Georgia Court of Appeals has held
that this statute imposes a duty on the employer to "warn other
employees of dangers incident to employment that 'the employer knows
For a
or ought to know but which are unknown to the employee."'7
plaintiff to sustain an action for negligent hiring or retention, the
plaintiff must show that the employer hired an individual who "the
employer knew or should have known posed a risk of harm to others

71.

Id. at 768-70, 708 S.E.2d at 683-84.

72. Id. at 770-71, 708 S.E.2d at 684-85.
73. Id. at 770, 708 S.E.2d at 684 (quoting Record Town, Inc. v. Sugarloaf Mills Ltd.
P'ship, 301 Ga. App. 367, 368, 687 S.E.2d 640, 642 (2009)).
74. Id. at 770-71, 708 S.E.2d at 684 (quoting Andrews v. Skinner, 158 Ga. App. 229,
230, 279 S.E.2d 523, 525 (1981)).
75. Id. at 771, 708 S.E.2d at 685.

76. Id.
77. O.C.G.A § 34-7-20 (2008).
78. Id.
79. Tecumseh Prods. Co. v. Rigdon, 250 Ga. App. 739, 740, 552 S.E.2d 910, 912 (2001);
O.C.G.A § 34-7-20.
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where it [was] reasonably foreseeable from the employee's tendencies or
propensities that the employee could cause the type of harm sustained
by the plaintiff."so Typically, "the determination of whether an
employer used ordinary care in hiring an employee is a jury issue"'
and is only a question of law "where the evidence is plain, palpable and
undisputable."8 2
During the survey period, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit affirmed in Doe v. Fulton DeKalb HospitalAuthority"
that to sustain a negligent hiring action, the plaintiff must demonstrate
that the employer knew or should have known that the employee "was
not suited for the particular employment."' In Fulton DeKalb, three
female patients receiving treatment in Grady Hospital's methadone
clinic claimed they were sexually harassed by a male substance abuse
counselor.'
An internal investigation conducted by Grady Hospital
revealed that the counselor made inappropriate sexual comments outside
the standard regimen of treatment. The investigation also revealed the
counselor's similar misconduct at other facilities. The counselor was
terminated by Grady Hospital upon the close of the investigation."
The trial court granted Grady Hospital's motion for summary
judgment on the negligent hiring and retention claims, and the patients
appealed. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the trial court and held that
preemployment background screening did not indicate that the counselor
had any propensity to commit acts of sexual misconduct.' Therefore,
the "plain, palpable and undisputable" evidence demonstrated that
Grady Hospital was not liable to the plaintiffs for damages.
VI.

RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR

Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer may be held
vicariously liable for the negligence or intentional torts committed by his

80. Munroe v. Universal Health Servs., Inc., 277 Ga. 861, 863, 596 S.E.2d 604, 606
(2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).
81. Tecumseh Prods.Co., 250 Ga. App. at 741, 552 S.E.2d at 912.
82. Munroe, 277 Ga. at 864, 596 S.E.2d at 607 (quoting Robinson v. Kroger Co., 268 Ga.
735, 739, 493 S.E.2d 403, 408 (1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

83. 628 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 2010).
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at

1337 (quoting Munroe, 277 Ga. at 862, 596 S.E.2d at 605).
1327.
1330.
1332.
1338.

89. Id. (quoting Munroe, 277 Ga. at 862, 596 S.E.2d at 605) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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or her employee within the scope of employment."o To hold an employer vicariously liable for the torts of an employee, the court must find the
following two elements: (1) the employee was acting in furtherance of the
employer's business, and (2) the employee was acting within the scope
of the employer's business."

A.

Private Enterprise

Under Georgia law,
If a tort is committed by an employee not by reason of the employment,
but because of matters disconnected therewith, the employer is not
liable. Furthermore, [ilf a tortious act is committed not in furtherance
of the employer's business, but rather for purely personal reasons
disconnected from the authorized business of the master, the master
is not liable.92
In the survey period, the Georgia Court of Appeals determined, in BT

Two, Inc. v. Bennett,93 that an employee was not acting within the
scope of his employment when he assaulted another person." Several
individuals hosted a fundraising event at a private home for a BT Two,
Inc. (Buffalo's) manager. Multiple Buffalo's employees were in attendance, but there was no evidence that Buffalo's had itself financially
supported the event in any way. The party had a bartender, who was
married to a Buffalo's employee named Justin King. Hunter Bennett,
a cousin of a Buffalo's employee, arrived at the party and convinced an
individual leaving the party to give him the required wristband for free.
Bennett subsequently demanded unlimited beer from the bartender,
King's wife. After a minor confrontation, Bennett received the beer, but
King later assaulted Bennett, who sustained serious injuries. Bennett
claimed that Buffalo's was liable for King's actions under the theory of
respondeat superior. The trial court denied Buffalo's motion for
summary judgment."
The court of appeals reversed the trial court upon determining that
liability could not be imputed to the employer.9 6 The true test of an
employee acting within the scope of employment is "whether it was done

90. CHARLES R. ADAMS III, GEORGIA LAW OF TORTS 270 (2010-2011 ed.).
91. Id. at 272.
92. Dowdell v. Krystal Co., 291 Ga. App. 469, 470, 662 S.E.2d 150, 153 (2008)
(alteration in original) (quoting Piedmont Hosp., Inc. v. Palladino, 276 Ga. 612, 613-14, 580
S.E.2d 215, 217 (2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
93. 307 Ga. App. 649, 706 S.E.2d 87 (2011).
94. Id. at 649-50, 706 S.E.2d at 88-89.
95. Id. at 650-51, 706 S.E.2d at 89-90.
96. Id. at 653, 706 S.E.2d at 91.
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within the scope of the actual transaction of the master's business for
accomplishing the ends of his employment."" In this case, the evidence
was clear and indisputable; even if Buffalo's had sponsored the event,
the assault on Bennett was not "within the scope of [King's] employment
or in furtherance of Buffalo's business."' The court affirmed precedent,
holding that assaults generally are not in furtherance of the master's
business, even when the place and time would likely be considered
within the scope of employment."

B.

Employer-Owned Vehicle

Generally, an employee is not acting within the scope of employment
when commuting to and from work."oo Therefore, an employer is
typically not vicariously liable for the actions of a commuting employee.Oi However, when an employer owns the vehicle involved in the
tort, the general rule changes:
Where a vehicle is involved in a collision, and it is shown that the
automobile is owned by a person, and that the operator of the vehicle
is in the employment of that person, a presumption arises that the
employee was in the scope of his employment at the time of the
collision, and the burden is then on the defendant employer to show
otherwise. 02
The presumption may "be overcome by uncontroverted evidence.""
In Farzaneh v. Merit Construction Co.,104 the Georgia Court of
Appeals held that an employer could not be held liable for the negligence
of an employee driving a vehicle that was previously owned by the
employer.105 Merit Construction Company (Merit) employed laborers

97. Id. at 652, 706 S.E.2d at 90 (quoting Brownlee v. Winn-Dixie Atlanta, 240 Ga.
App. 368, 369, 523 S.E.2d 596, 597-98 (1999)).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 653, 706 S.E.2d at 90-91; see, e.g., Drury v. Harris Ventures, Inc., 302 Ga.
App. 545, 547, 691 S.E.2d 356, 358 (2010); Dowdell, 291 Ga. App. at 470-71, 662 S.E.2d at
153; Worstell Parking, Inc. v. Aisida, 212 Ga. App. 605, 606, 442 S.E.2d 469, 470 (1994).
100. Hunter v. Modern Cont'l Constr. Co., 287 Ga. App. 689, 690-91, 652 S.E.2d 583,
584 (2007).
101. Id. at 691, 652 S.E.2d at 584 (quoting Clo White Co. v. Lattimore, 263 Ga. App.
839, 839, 590 S.E.2d 381, 383 (2003)).
102. Allen Kane's Major Dodge, Inc. v. Barnes, 243 Ga. 776, 777, 257 S.E.2d 186, 188
(1979) (quoting W. Point Pepperell, Inc. v. Knowles, 132 Ga. App. 253, 255, 208 S.E.2d 17,
19 (1974)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
103. Id. at 778, 257 S.E.2d at 189 (quoting F.E. Fortenberry & Sons, Inc. v. Malmberg,
97 Ga. App. 162, 165, 102 S.E.2d 667, 671 (1958)).
104. 309 Ga. App. 637, 710 S.E.2d 839 (2011).
105. Id. at 640. 710 S.E.2d at 843.
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who would travel from home to various job sites. Redic purchased a
company truck from Merit at a reduced price with favorable payment
terms. While Redic had paid in full and maintained insurance on the
truck, Merit occasionally paid for repairs and issued a cell phone. While
on his way to work, Redic struck and injured Farzaneh, who brought
suit against Merit. o

Under Georgia law, an employer is only liable for the torts of an
employee when the action is in furtherance of the master's business and
While an employer is not liable for the
not a personal matter.'o
actions of a commuting employee,'o an employer-owned vehicle shifts
the burden to the employer to overcome this presumption.'09 However,
"special circumstances" may impute liability, even when the employee is
engaged in a personal matter."o Also, liability may attach to an
employer when the act involved was a special mission."' The special
mission exception requires "that the errand or mission itself be a special
or uncustomary one, made at the employer's request or direction.""l 2
In Farzanehthe court of appeals affirmed the trial court in finding the
vehicle was not employer owned."' Because Merit no longer owned
the vehicle, the burden remained on the plaintiff to show ownership." 4
The Merit-issued cell phone and possible vehicle repair allowance were
not enough to establish ownership or a special circumstance."' In
addition, there was no special mission exception, as the commute to work
was customary."' Therefore, the court held that no liability could be
imputed to the employer since the vehicle was not employer-owned."m

106. Id. at 637-38, 710 S.E.2d at 841-42.
107. Id. at 639, 710 S.E.2d at 842 (quoting Clo White Co., 263 Ga. App. at 840, 590
S.E.2d at 383).
108. Id. (quoting Riel v. Paulding County Bd. of Educ., 206 Ga. App. 230, 231, 425
S.E.2d 305, 307 (1992)).
109. Id. at 640, 710 S.E.2d at 843 (citing Allen Kane's Major Dodge, 243 Ga. App. at
777, 257 S.E.2d at 188).
110. Id. at 640-41, 710 S.E.2d at 843-44 (citing Hunter, 287 Ga. App. at 691,652 S.E.2d
at 584).
111. Id. at 643, 710 S.E.2d at 845.
112. Id. (quoting Patterson v. Se. Newspapers, Inc., 243 Ga. App. 241, 242, 533 S.E.2d
119, 121 (2000)).
113. Id. at 643-44, 710 S.E.2d at 845.
114. Id. at 640, 710 S.E.2d at 843.
115. Id. at 641, 710 S.E.2d at 843.
116. Id. at 643, 710 S.E.2d at 845.
117. Id. at 643-44, 710 S.E.2d at 845.
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Independent Contractoror Employee

Vicarious liability under respondeat superior generally does not apply
to the acts of independent contractors." 8 Therefore, in determining
vicarious liability, a court must initially resolve whether an individual
is an independent contractor or an employee.
In Yancey v. Watkins,120 the Georgia Court of Appeals considered
whether a crop-duster was an independent contractor and whether the
employer could be held liable for his negligence.' 2 1 Ussery and
Watkins were neighboring farmers. Ussery hired Bloodsworth to spray
his crops. After Bloodsworth had aerially applied the chemical, Watkins
claimed that the excess drifted onto his farm and destroyed his crop.'22
To determine liability, the court examined whether Bloodsworth was
O.C.G.A. § 51-2-4124 states that an
an independent contractor.'23
employer is generally not liable for the torts of his employee when the
The chief test to
employee exercises an independent business.'2 5
determine independent contractor status is "whether the contract gives,
or the employer assumes, the right to control the time, manner, and
method of performance of the work, as distinguished from the right
merely to require certain definite results in conformity with the
contract." 26 In this case, Bloodsworth was an independent contractor
and operated an independent business.127 Ussery had limited control
over Bloodsworth's crop-dusting plane, hired him on a one-time basis,
and designated no specific time for the crop-dusting.12 8 Also, Bloods29
worth operated his crop-dusting business as a separate entity.1
Notwithstanding the general rule, this case shows an exception to
independent contractor liability. Even though the court determined that

118. See O.C.G.A § 51-2-4 (2000) ("An employer generally is not responsible for torts
committed by his employee when the employee exercises an independent business and is
not subject to the immediate direction and control of the employer.").
119. See id.; see also ADAMS, supra note 90, at 295 ("An 'independent contractor' is one
who, in the pursuit of his own independent business, undertakes to perform a task for
another, while retaining for himself the right to control the means, method, and manner
of its accomplishment.").
120. 308 Ga. App. 695, 708 S.E.2d 539 (2011).
121. Id. at 697, 708 S.E.2d at 542.
122. Id. at 695, 708 S.E.2d at 541.
123. Id. at 697, 708 S.E.2d at 542.
124. O.C.G.A § 51-2-4 (2000).
125. Yancey, 308 Ga. App. at 697, 708 S.E.2d at 542; see also O.C.G.A. § 51-2-4.
126. Yancey, 308 Ga. App. at 697, 708 S.E.2d at 542.
127. Id. at 698, 708 S.E.2d at 543.
128. Id.
129. Id.
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Bloodsworth was an independent contractor, the employer could still
possibly be held liable for his negligence.' 0 Citing O.C.G.A. § 51-25(2)," the court noted that an employer is still liable for negligence
"[i]f according to the employer's previous knowledge and experience, the
work to be done is in its nature dangerous to others however carefully
The court determined that there was substantial
performed.",12
evidence as to the danger of crop-dusting and Ussery's knowledge of that
As a result, there were material issues of fact, and the
danger."
court affirmed the denial of summary judgment."'
VII.
A.

RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS

Covenants Not to Compete

On November 2, 2010, voters ratified an amendment to the Georgia
Constitution that authorizes enforcement of covenants that restrain in
a reasonable manner.'"
Prior to this constitutional amendment,
agreements that placed general restraints on trade were void as against
public policy."' Courts disfavored noncompete agreements on contractual relations because any restriction on trade reduces competition.'
Pursuant to the 2010 amendment to the Georgia Constitution, a judge
has "the power to limit the duration, geographic area, and scope of
prohibited activities provided in a contract or agreement restricting or
During the 2011 regular
regulating competitive activities . . . ."1
session, the Georgia General Assembly passed House Bill 30,139 which
amended Chapter 8 of Title 30 of the O.C.G.A. to authorize the use of
reasonable restrictive covenants.'4 0 Prior to these changes in the law,
covenants were valid as a partial restraint on trade if the agreement was

130. Id. at 699-700, 708 S.E.2d at 544.
131. O.C.G.A. § 51-2-5(2) (2000).
132. 308 Ga. App. at 698, 708 S.E.2d at 543 (internal quotation marks omitted);
O.C.G.A. § 51-2-5(2).
133. Yancey, 308 Ga. App. at 699-700, 708 S.E.2d at 544.
134. Id. at 700, 708 S.E.2d at 544.
135. Ga. H.R. Res. 178 § 1, Reg. Sess., 2010 Ga. Laws 1260, 1260-61 (amending GA.
CONST. art. III, § 6, para. 5(c)(3)); see supra Part II(A).
136. See O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2(a)(2) (2010), amended by O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2(a)(2) (Supp.
2011).
137. WIMBERLY, supra note 56, at 115.
138. GA. CONST. art. III, § 6, para. 5(c)(3).
139. Ga. H.R. Bill 30, Reg. Sess. (codified at O.C.G.A. §§ 13-8-2 13-8-50 to -59 (Supp.
2011)).
140. Id. § 4 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 13-8-50).
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specific and reasonable in duration, territorial coverage, and scope of
activities prohibited.' 4 '
Whether the terms of a noncompete agreement are reasonable is a
question of law that takes into account "the nature and extent of the
trade or business, the situation of the parties, and all other relevant
circumstances." 42 A questionable restriction, if not void on its face,
may require the introduction of additional facts to determine whether it
is reasonable. 43 However, depending on the type of contract, courts
apply different levels of scrutiny in determining the reasonableness of
the contract.14 4 If a noncompete agreement is ancillary to an employment agreement, a stricter standard applies; if any portion of the
agreement is considered overbroad or unreasonable, the entire agreement becomes invalid. 145 If the agreement is pursuant to a contract
for the sale of a business, a less stringent standard permits broader
provisions; even if provisions of the agreement are deemed overbroad or
unreasonable, the court may "blue-pencil" the agreement, rewriting or
severing the overly broad provisions."' 6 However, "in restrictive
covenant cases strictly scrutinized as employment contracts, Georgia
does not employ the 'blue pencil' doctrine of severability." 47

141. Cox v. Altus Helathcare & Hospice, Inc., 308 Ga. App. 28, 31, 706 S.E.2d 660, 664
(2011) (quoting Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Walker, 251 Ga. 536, 537, 307 S.E.2d 914, 916
(1983); see also O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2.1(a) (2010), repealed by Ga. H.R. Bill 30 § 3; W.R. Grace
& Co. v. Mouyal, 262 Ga. 464, 465, 422 S.E.2d 529, 531 (1992).
142. Sysco Food Servs. of Atlanta, Inc. v. Chupp, 225 Ga. App. 584, 585, 484 S.E.2d
323, 325 (1997).
143. Koger Props., Inc. v. Adams-Cates Co., 247 Ga. 68, 69, 274 S.E.2d 329, 331(1981).
144. See WIMBERLY, supra note 56, at 115.
145. Drumheller v. Drumheller Bag & Supply, Inc., 204 Ga. App. 623, 626, 420 S.E.2d
331, 334 (1992) (quoting Watson v. Waffle House, Inc., 253 Ga. 671, 672, 324 S.E.2d 175,
177 (1985)) (discussing that courts have held covenants not to compete "to be nonseverable
and halvel held that overbreadth of one portion of the covenant so taints the entire
covenant as to make it unenforceable").
146. Id.
147. Advance Tech. Consultants, Inc. v. RoadTrac, LLC, 250 Ga. App. 317, 320, 551
S.E.2d 735, 737 (2001). The court in Advance Technology also stated that "Georgia courts
have traditionally divided restrictive covenants into two categories: 'covenants ancillary to
an employment contract, which receive strict scrutiny and are not blue-penciled, and
covenants ancillary to a sale of la] business, which receive much less scrutiny and may be
blue-penciled.'" Id. at 319, 551 S.E.2d at 736 (quoting Habif, Arogeti & Wynne, P.C. v.
Baggett, 231 Ga. App. 289, 289-90, 498 S.E.2d 346, 349 (1998)). However, the recent
amendment to the Georgia Constitution permits courts to blue-pencil restrictive covenants
ancillary to employment contracts. See supra Part II(A); see also supra text accompanying
note 11.
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Scope of ProhibitedActivities

During the survey period, the Georgia Court of Appeals held, in Cox
v. Altus Healthcare & Hospice, Inc.,148 that restrictive covenants which
contain neither geographical, temporal, nor personnel contact limitations
constitute an unlawful restraint on trade.14 9 In Altus Healthcare,
Edwin Cox began negotiations to purchase a hospice care facility.
During these negotiations, Altus and Cox entered into non-disclosure
The parties broke off
and non-solicitation restrictive covenants.
negotiations, and Cox purchased a different hospice provider. Altus
moved to enforce the covenants, and the trial court issued an interlocutory injunction."
In determining the reasonableness of the restraints,
the court of appeals examined "the nature and extent of the trade or
business, the situation of the parties, and all the other circumstances."151 Because the particular covenants lacked a terminable time
period to be enforced, the covenants were invalid and unenforceable." 2
Because the covenants were conditional upon employment, the court
153
rejected any arguments that an agreement may be blue-penciled.
A strict scrutiny standard is applied to covenants that are conditional on
employment.'5 4 Even if the covenants were not conditional upon Cox's
employment, the court would have rejected blue-penciling the agreement
because the sale was never consummated. 5 5

C.

Specification with Particularity

During the survey period, the Georgia Court of Appeals continued to
apply a four-part test to determine the enforceability of a restrictive
covenant: whether "(1) the restraint is reasonable; (2) founded upon
valuable consideration; (3) is reasonably necessary to protect the party
in whose favor it is imposed; and (4) does not unduly prejudice the
In Gordon Document Products, Inc. v.
interests of the public."'

148. 308 Ga. App. 28, 706 S.E.2d 660 (2011).
149. Id. at 31, 706 S.E.2d at 664.
150. Id. at 29, 706 S.E.2d at 662-63.
151. Id. at 31, 706 S.E.2d at 664 (quoting Habif, 231 Ga. App. at 292, 498 S.E.2d at
350).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Gordon Document Prods., Inc. v. Serv. Tech., Inc., 308 Ga. App. 445, 447, 708
S.E.2d 48, 52 (2011) (quoting Hostetler v. Answerthink, Inc., 267 Ga. App. 325, 328, 599
S.E.2d 271, 274 (2004)).
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Services Technology, Inc.,"' two employees left Gordon Document
Products (GDP) to work for a competitor, Services Technology, Inc. (STI).
During their employment with GDP, the employees signed agreements
The court of
that contained non-compete restrictive covenants.'
appeals held that the agreements were overly broad because the covered
territory represented the entire GDP sales area."'9 One employee
assisted in sales, and the other was a sales representative that only
The court held that a
worked in a portion of the covered area.'
territory where the employer does business, but an employee does not,
is overly broad, absent a specific business justification from the
employer. 161

D. Choice of Law Provisions
The Georgia Court of Appeals held in Bunker Hill International,Ltd.
v. NationsbuilderInsurance Services, Inc. 62 that the question of venue
is a procedural issue to be determined by the rule of lex fori.'6 3 In
Bunker Hill, Kevin Cunningham entered into an employment agreement
with Nationsbuilder that contained a non-compete clause. Cunningham
left his position with Nationsbuilder and began work for a direct
competitor, Bunker Hill. In Georgia, Bunker Hill moved for a declaratory judgment that the covenants were unenforceable. Nationsbuilder
claimed that, due to a choice of law provision in the contract, Illinois, not
Georgia, was the proper venue for this litigation.'64 Forum-selection
clauses in Georgia "are prima facie valid and should be enforced unless
the opposing party shows that such enforcement would be unreasonable
under the circumstances."16 5 The court of appeals stated that a party
could overcome the forum-selection clause by showing "at least one of the
covenants violate [d] Georgia public policy and . .. such a covenant would
likely be enforced against him [or her] by an Illinois court.""' The

157. 308 Ga. App. 445, 708 S.E.2d 48 (2011).
158. Id. at 445, 708 S.E.2d at 50.
159. Id. at 447, 708 S.E.2d at 51-52.
160. Id. at 446 n.2, 448, 708 S.E.2d at 51 n.2, 52.
161. Id. at 448, 708 S.E.2d at 52 (quoting Dent Wizard Intl. Corp. v. Brown, 272 Ga.
App. 553, 556, 612 S.E.2d 873, 876 (2005)).
162. 309 Ga. App. 503, 710 S.E.2d 662 (2011).
163. Id. at 506, 710 S.E.2d at 665 (quoting Brinson v. Martin, 220 Ga. App. 638, 638,
469 S.E.2d 537, 538 (1996)) ("Under the rule of lex fori, procedural or remedial questions
are governed by the law of the forum, the state in which the action is brought.").
164. Id. at 503, 710 S.E.2d at 664.
165. Id. at 506, 710 S.E.2d at 665 (quoting lero v. Mohawk Finishing Prods., Inc., 243
Ga. App. 670, 671, 534 S.E.2d 136, 138 (2000)).
166. Id. at 507, 710 S.E.2d at 665-66.
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court's examination of recent Illinois precedent regarding restrictive
covenants revealed that Illinois courts invalidate only the most broad
covenants and will sustain covenants lacking certain restrictions.'
Cunningham demonstrated that Illinois courts would enforce the
agreement, which would be unenforceable under Georgia law for public
Thus, under the rule of lex fori, the court applied
policy reasons.'
Georgia law and invalidated the restrictive covenants. 169
Non-disclosure Agreements
In Fine v. Communication TRends, Inc.,"' the Georgia Court of
7
Appeals examined the enforceability of nondisclosure agreements. '
Lynette Fine worked for Communication Trends (CTI), and her contract
contained several restrictive covenants. During a meeting with the CEO
of AlIscope, a competitor, Fine discussed the possibility of employment
and demonstrated projected earnings based on that employment. Fine
used competitive research and her knowledge of billing rates charged to
CTI's clients to show potential earnings. Fine left CTI and joined
Allscope.172 CTI brought action against Fine for disclosing confidential
client and billing information to a competitor.17 Because Georgia had
not yet adopted the blue-pencil theory of restrictive covenants, the court
rejected CTI's argument."' Additionally, CTI introduced no evidence
that confidential information was released.'7 1
E.

Non-solicitationAgreements
The court of appeals held in Fine that a restrictive covenant is overly
broad when former employees are barred from accepting business
without active solicitation, regardless of which party initiated contact.'76 The day after Fine left employment with CTI, she distributed
business cards at an industry dinner to former clients, informing them
that she could not actively solicit their business. Furthermore, Fine told
former clients that, to continue a business relationship, a statement that

F

167. Id. at 507, 710 S.E.2d at 666 (quoting Eichmann v. Nat. Hosp. & Health Care
Servs., Inc., 719 N.E.2d 1141, 1144, 1148 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999)).
168. Id. at 508, 710 S.E.2d at 666.
169. Id. at 508, 710 S.E.2d at 667.
170. 305 Ga. App. 298, 699 S.E.2d 623 (2010).
171. Id. at 298, 699 S.E.2d at 627.
172. Id. at 299-300, 699 S.E.2d at 627-28.
173. Id. at 307, 699 S.E.2d at 633
174. Id. at 307, 699 S.E.2d at 632.
175. Id. at 307, 699 S.E.2d at 633.
176. Id. at 306, 699 S.E.2d at 632.
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Fine did not solicit their business would be necessary. Later, CTI found
that several clients switched their accounts.1 7 7
CTI commenced an action to enforce the non-solicitation restrictive
covenant. The trial court found that the restrictive covenant was
overbroad because it prohibited Fine from merely accepting business
from former clients.7 7
The court of appeals held that "a covenant
prohibiting a former employee from merely accepting business, without
any solicitation, is not reasonable" and, therefore, was not reasonably
limited in the scope of activities prohibited. 179
Additionally, CTI failed to establish that Fine breached her fiduciary
duty and loyalty by accepting business from CTI's former clients or
destroying CTI client files."so There is no breach of fiduciary duty
when an employee makes plans to work for a competitor so long as the
employee does not engage in direct competition before the original
employment relationship ends.'"' The court found no evidence that
Fine engaged in direct competition prior to leaving CTI's employment. 8 2 However, the court of appeals remanded the issue of destroyed client files to the trial court because of circumstantial evidence.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

Although labor and employment issues in Georgia law often are not as
complex as their federal counterparts, the issues arising under state law
are becoming more challenging with each passing year. Adding to this
challenge is the growing overlap between state and federal issues.
Regardless of whether a practitioner professes to specialize in state,
federal, administrative, or trial law, it is important to recognize that any
one law or legal proceeding can and does impact relations between
employer and employee.

177. Id. at 300, 699 S.E.2d at 628.
178. Id. at 306, 699 S.E.2d at 632.
179. Id. (quoting Waldeck v. Curtis 1000, Inc., 261 Ga. App 590, 592, 583 S.E.2d 266,

268 (2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
180. Id. at 309, 699 S.E.2d at 634.
18 1.

Id.

182.

Id.

183.

Id. at 311, 699 S.E.2d at 635.

